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MAYO V. PROMETHEUS: REORGANIZING THE TOOLBOX FOR
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER AND USES OF NATURAL
LAWS
Bryan Wisecup∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in medical technology, in particular the development of
new and improved medical methods, pose a unique problem for the
United States patent system, in that some of these inventions exist at the
fringe of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As a
threshold requirement before consideration of utility, novelty, or nonobviousness, patent eligible subject matter requires that a new invention
be of such a nature as to fall within an inventive category enumerated in
the statute.1 In revising the patent system in 1952, Congress intended
for the subject matter eligibility requirement to be broad, encompassing
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter . . . .”2 Despite this broad intent, federal courts have long
recognized an exception to patent eligible subject matter for attempts to
patent laws of nature.3 Since most inventions rely to some extent upon a
law of nature, the question arises concerning in just what manner such
inventions are permitted to rely on or incorporate these laws of nature.4
For the vast majority of patent applications, the subject matter of the
invention fits snugly into one of the enumerated categories in § 101, and
the demarcation of patent eligible subject matter need not be resolved
with any definiteness. However, over the past forty years, technological
advances in computer technology, software, medical treatment methods,
and genetics have resulted in questions about where the boundary lies
between a patentable and un-patentable use of a law of nature.5 As
∗ Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (describing
patent eligible subject matter as the first door through which an inventor must pass before matters of
novelty and obviousness are even considered).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
3. E.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“He who
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the
law of nature to a new and useful end.”).
4. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“Our earlier opinions lend support to our
present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.”).
5. Id. at 175–88 (discussing the challenges with computer technology and software); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (addressing medical methods);
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (analyzing the
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inventions come closer to this boundary between the broad statutory
definition of patent eligible subject matter and the judicial exception for
laws of nature, the distinction between permissible and impermissible
use of a natural law is not easily discernable.
This lack of clarity over the boundary of patent eligible subject matter
for laws of nature has broad implications for the rate of innovation in the
United States. The rate of technological innovation has increased
dramatically over the past thirty years, greatly improving the efficiency
of gathering and collecting data about the physical world and opening
up new fields of research. These new fields present new challenges to
the patent system, in particular the concept of patent eligible subject
matter. Genetics research presents the question of whether specific gene
sequences, though naturally occurring, can be isolated and patented;6
computer and data technology pose the question of whether data
conversion operations and methods satisfy the requirements for eligible
subject matter;7 and medical methods research challenges the scope of
patent eligible subject matter.8
Future developments in the legal standard for patent eligible subject
matter will likely have a substantial impact on the medical research
field, especially with respect to medical methods research. Health care
spending represents more than 17% of the gross domestic product of the
United States and continues to increase, and U.S. companies spend
billions of dollars on medical research to capitalize on this market.9
From 2007 through 2011, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) granted 30,035 patents in the technology class for
pharmaceuticals and associated methods.10 This total was the most of
any technology class examined by the PTO and represents over 3% of
the total number of patents granted.11
With medical methods in particular, many commentators theorize that
subject matter eligibility in the field of genetics).
6. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1303.
7. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175.
8. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289.
9. Alex Wayne, Health-Care Spending to Reach 20% of U.S. Economy by 2021, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, June 13, 2012 (reporting that spending on health care services rose 3.9% in 2011 to about 17.9%
of the U.S. GDP); $95 Billion a Year Spent on Medical Research, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 2005
(“Total U.S. spending on medical research has doubled in the past decade to nearly $95 billion a year”
in 2005).
10. Patenting by Geographic Region, Breakout by Technology Class, USPTO (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov (From the “Patent” menu select “Statistics,” select “General Patent Statistics,”
and under patents select “Calendar Year Patent Statistics.” From the table of contents, select “By
Patented Technology” and then scroll down to the report named “clsstc/stc_cl_gd.” Open reports by
clicking on the hyperlink. Click on “all countries”) (Technology class 424, “Drug, Bio-Affecting and
Body Treating Compositions,” also included technology class 514, which is the technology class of the
patent at issue in Mayo).
11. Id.
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a change in jurisprudence concerning patent eligible subject matter
could have a drastic effect on future funding of medical research, if the
change results in precluding an entire class of medical method claims
from eligibility for patent protection. Even without a clear definition of
what is patentable, the uncertainty makes it difficult for researchers to
predict the value of certain types of research and estimate the possible
return on the investment of research funds.
For the past thirty years, federal courts have tried a number of
approaches to determine the eligibility of subject matter, but have not
adequately defined the judicial exception to eligible subject matter for
laws of nature. In the latest attempt in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Labs, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
medical methods patent on the grounds that it was an attempt to patent a
law of nature.12 The Court attempted to illuminate a clear standard for
determining the boundary of the judicial exception to patent eligible
subject matter for laws of nature, but its efforts have fallen short. The
Court only deepened the confusion by covering the issue of patent
eligible subject matter with a patchwork quilt of past jurisprudence that
adds very little to clarify the boundary of the appropriate use of a natural
law in an invention.
This article seeks to evaluate the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo,
to consider the decision’s impact on future patent infringement cases,
and to suggest alternative pathways to clarify the issue of patent eligible
subject matter for medical methods. Part II provides an overview of the
statutory subject matter requirement for patent eligibility and the
development of the judicial exception for natural laws, abstract ideas,
and natural phenomenon. Part III parses through the Court’s decision in
Mayo and examines the reaction to Mayo in the lower courts and among
industry participants. Part IV critiques the Court’s analysis in Mayo,
proposes an alternative to the inventive concept method for evaluating
subject matter eligibility, and suggests that Congress take action to
examine the complex policy considerations surrounding eligible subject
matter for medical methods and, if necessary, take action to clarify the
standard.
II. PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JUDICIAL EXCEPTION FOR NATURAL LAWS
Introduction to patent eligible subject matter begins with the
Constitutional mandate to promote progress. Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o
12. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”13 In pursuit of this mandate, the first
Congress of the United States established the patent system under the
direction of Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State.14 As
expressly stated in the “Progress Clause,” the purpose of the patent
system is to promote progress in the useful arts.15 The intended result is
to strengthen the economy by facilitating the introduction of new
products into the market, which advances manufacturing and creates
jobs.16
The patent system accomplishes this by conferring patent rights to an
inventor in exchange for a complete disclosure of the invention. The
patent rights granted to the inventor are negative property rights,
meaning that the inventor is granted the right to exclude others from
practicing the invention, but the inventor does not possess an unbounded
right to use or practice the invention.17 Therefore, a patent grants an
inventor a right to exclude others from practicing the invention.18
Representing a critical element of the patent, the claims of the patent
distinctly define the boundaries of the inventor’s exclusive rights.19
To be eligible for patent protection, the invention must meet the
statutory requirements for patentability. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”20 This section sets forth the
first two patentability requirements. First, the invention must be useful,
and second, the invention must be a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.21 The last phrase of the statute, “subject to the
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The productive effort thereby fostered will
have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture
into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our
citizens.”).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a
process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process . . . .”); see also Kewanee, 416
U.S. at 480.
18. Id.
19. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 65 (Aspen Publishing, 3d ed. 2009) (describing the
function of patent claims).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
21. Id.
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conditions and requirements of this title,” refers to the additional
patentability requirements of novelty, obviousness, and adequacy of
disclosure.22 The patent eligible subject matter requirement is a
threshold requirement that must be determined before moving on to the
novelty and non-obviousness requirements.23
The discussion of patent eligible subject matter begins in § 101 with
the requirement that the invention be a “process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter.”24 Analyzing the statutory construction of
§ 101, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress intended for § 101 to
have a wide scope, because of the expansive language used in drafting
the statute.25 In addition, Congressional reports preceding passage of
the 1952 Patent Act indicated a desire to “include anything under the
sun that is made by man.”26
Although Congress intended for § 101 to be broad, courts have long
recognized a judicial exception to patent eligible subject matter for laws
of nature, physical phenomenon, abstract ideas, unapplied mathematical
algorithms, and products of nature.27 This exception is based on the
idea that certain information is a manifestation of nature and should be
free to all persons.28 The demarcation of what is and what is not such a
manifestation of nature is more difficult to determine, and the courts
have repeatedly attempted to define this boundary. The motivation
behind the exception is to make sure that patents do not preclude the use
of natural laws in further innovation.29 Though patent protection is
intended to motivate innovation by providing a financial incentive for
22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (novelty requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2006) (non-obviousness requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (sufficiency of disclosure requirements).
23. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“The obligation to determine what type of
discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact,
new or obvious.”).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
26. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 6 (1952).
27. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1854) (holding claim 8 of the Morse Patent to be unpatentable subject matter as an attempt to patent the use of electromagnetism to transmit characters over
a distance; discussing Nielson v. Hartford, a case from the English Court of Exchequer that first
discussed the issue of patentable subject matter in relation to a patent granted for the first blast furnace);
LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) (laws of nature are not eligible for patent protection); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948) (discoveries of natural phenomena
are not eligible for patent protection); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–30 (2010) (abstract ideas
are not patent eligible subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–72 (1972) (applying the
judicial exception to unapplied mathematical algorithms); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980) (discussing the judicial exception to patent eligible subject matter for products of nature).
28. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
29. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific
and technological work.”).
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research and development, claims that are too broad, such that they
foreclose the tools of science from use by others, can have a negative
effect on innovation.30
Although the judicial exception for laws of nature seems
straightforward, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a workable
standard that provides adequate notice to inventors.31 The Court has
favored two approaches to deciding the question of patent eligible
subject matter. First, the Court has employed an “inventive concept”
analysis, wherein the Court examines the patent claims to determine if
they include an inventive concept beyond the expression of the natural
law.32 In response to an attempt to patent a mathematical algorithm, the
Court stated, “[i]f there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end.”33 In essence, the “inventive concept” approach looks to see if the
claimed invention is a practical application of the law of nature.
Concerned that a skilled claim draftsperson could circumvent the patent
eligible subject matter requirement through the crafty choice of
language, the Court enhanced the standard by requiring more than
adding insubstantial post-solution activity to a natural law in order to
make the claim patentable subject matter.34 Stated another way, adding
insignificant steps to the natural law is not enough to make it patentable.
In addition, the Court has also held that confining the applicability of a
natural law to a narrow and specific field of endeavor is also insufficient
to make the claim to a natural law patentable subject matter.35
Second, the Supreme Court and lower courts have looked to the
“machine or transformation test” to decide the patent eligibility of
process patent claims.36 Under the machine or transformation test, a
process is patent eligible subject matter only “if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article
30. See id. at 71–72.
31. From now on, the article will refer to the judicial exception for natural laws and will leave
off abstract ideas, mathematical algorithms and natural phenomenon for the sake of efficiency.
32. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding the patent for recalculating an alarm limit
invalid because the claims included no other inventive concept other than using an algorithm to
calculate a new alarm limit and then storing that alarm limit in computer memory).
33. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67.
34. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590–91 (outlining the principle that post-solution activity must establish
some additional inventive concept in order to transform a law of nature/mathematical algorithm into
patent eligible subject matter).
35. See id. at 592–96.
36. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 70–71 (discussing prior precedents favoring the machine or
transformation test but declining to make it the exclusive test for patent eligibility for process claims);
see also Bilski v. Kappos, 545 F.3d 945, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Bilski I] (claiming the
machine or transformation test to be the exclusive test for patent eligible subject matter for process
claims), overruled by, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) [hereinafter Bilski II].
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into a different state or thing.”37 In other words, a process claim based
on a law of nature would not preempt the use of that law of nature if the
process was confined to the use of a particular machine or transformed
materials in a particular way.38 Prior to Bilski II, decided in 2010, the
Federal Circuit favored the machine or transformation test for determine
patent eligibility for process patents, but in Bilski II, the Supreme Court
held that the machine or transformation test was only one consideration
and not the exclusive test to determine the patent eligible subject matter
for process claims.39
While these are the two primary methods used by the Court to
determine patent eligible subject matter under § 101, other methods
have also been used. One method suggested in Flook was to treat a law
of nature as an invention already existing, and therefore not novel, and
then seeing if anything else was left that was patentable.40 Functionally,
this method is similar to the “inventive concept” method. Another
consideration is the extent to which the claims involving the natural law
preempt future use of the natural law.41 None of these approaches have
been adequate to resolve the confusion and doubt surrounding the
question of patent eligible subject matter for inventions that make use of
laws of nature.
The Supreme Court has not been the only entity responsible for
making changes to the scope of patent eligible subject matter. In the
past, Congress has clarified and changed the scope of patent eligible
subject matter by passing legislation to alter patent eligibility for certain
types of technology. To promote innovation in plant breeding, Congress
enacted the Plant Patent Act in 1930 to extend patent eligibility to
asexually reproduced plants, which had formerly been considered by
courts to be unpatentable as products of nature.42 Congress also added a
separate patent provision for design patents to cover new ornamental
designs for articles of manufacture.43 As part of the America Invents
Act of 2011, Congress enacted a provision declaring that “no patent may
issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism,”
thereby removing human organisms from patent eligible subject
matter.44 In the past, Congress has intervened to define patent eligible
37. Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 954.
38. Id.
39. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
40. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978).
41. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (stating that upholding the claims to the mathematical
algorithm would pre-empt the use of that algorithm in any use).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006); JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 288 (Aspen Publishing, 3d ed.
2009).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
44. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (enacted
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subject matter in certain fields of endeavor. Congress has not addressed
the patent eligible subject matter issue for medical methods or computer
software applications, and because of this, the Court continues to
struggle, as shown by its extensive discourse in Mayo.
III. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES V. PROMETHEUS LABS, INC.
For over thirty years, the Court has employed a variety of
considerations in determining whether process claims based on natural
laws or abstract ideas are patent eligible subject matter. With this
kaleidoscope backdrop of methods, the Court approached Mayo
intending to set forth a clear standard for determining statutory subject
matter eligibility for processes involving natural laws. This Casenote
looks first at the Court’s decision in Mayo and its attempt to clarify the
issue of patent eligible subject matter and then examines the response in
the lower courts in cases that have arisen since Mayo.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Mayo
Mayo involved an action against Mayo Collaborative Services for
infringement of two patents covering methods of administering
thiopurine drugs for the treatment of immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorders.45 In March of 2002, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) issued the 6,355,623 (‘623) Patent for a “[m]ethod of
treating IBD/Crohn’s disease and related conditions wherein drug
metabolite levels in host blood cells determine subsequent dosage.”46
Almost two years later, the USPTO granted a second patent, the
6,680,302 (‘302) Patent, to the same entity for a similar method for
optimizing the effectiveness of drug doses in treating immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorders.47
The claims represented in the ‘623 Patent follow a standard format
and include an administration step, in which the thiopurine drug is
administered to a patient, and a determination step, in which the blood
concentrations of the metabolites arising from administration of the drug
are measured. The third step is a wherein step, in which the result of the
determination step is compared to an experimentally determined
correlation between the concentration of the metabolites and the
effective dosage of the administered drug.
Below a certain
concentration, the results suggest that the dosage may be ineffective, and
Sept. 16, 2011).
45. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295–96 (2012).
46. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999).
47. U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 (filed Dec. 27, 2001).
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above a higher concentration, the results suggest that the dosage may
result in harmful side effects.48
Prometheus Labs became the exclusive license holder of both the
‘623 and ‘302 Patents and marketed and sold the medical method
described therein to Mayo Collaborative Services and Mayo Rochester,
who used the diagnostic method to treat patients.49 After several years
of purchasing the diagnostic test from Prometheus, Mayo planned to
develop and sell its own medical method for determining the
effectiveness of dosing levels for administering thiopurine drugs to treat
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders.50 The only substantial
difference in the Mayo test was a slightly higher threshold metabolite
concentration for the toxicity limit.51 As the sole exclusive license
holder, Prometheus Labs brought a claim for infringement of the ‘623
and ‘302 Patents.52
The procedural posture of Mayo demonstrates the confusion and
differences of opinion regarding the treatment of patent eligible subject
matter for medical methods. The district court found infringement
because the difference in the two tests was not significant, but declared
the patent invalid because the patent was an attempt to patent a law of
nature. In so holding, the district court applied an analysis similar to
Morse and Gottshalk, in which the attempt to patent a law of nature was
held invalid for precluding use of the natural law for future innovation.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of
invalidity. The Federal Circuit employed the machine or transformation
test and found that the administration of the drug to the patient caused a
transformation to the patient and that measurement of the concentration
of metabolites in the blood effected a transformation of the sample of
blood, which the court viewed as a tangible article.53 Upon granting a
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the Federal
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bilski II, which held that the machine or
transformation test was a consideration in determining eligible subject
matter but was not the only consideration.54 On remand, the Federal
48. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. See also Nathan A. Reed, Note, A New Metric To Determine
Patent Eligible Subject Matter for Medical Methods, 16 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 321, 332–36 (2012)
(describing in detail the treatment of autoimmune diseases with thiopurine drugs and the operation of
the medical method in patent number ‘623).
49. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295–96.
50. Id. at 1296.
51. For the metabolite 6-TG, the toxicity limit in the Prometheus patent method was 400 pmol
per 8x108. The Mayo test had an upper toxicity limit for 6-TG of 450 pmol per 8x108. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Circuit affirmed its prior decision, finding its analysis under the machine
or transformation test to be compelling despite its consideration of Bilski
II.55 The case returned to the Supreme Court on another grant of
certiorari.56 In a unanimous decision, the Court again reversed the
Federal Circuit decision and held the patent claims to be invalid as an
attempt to effectively claim a patent on a law of nature.57
The Supreme Court began its substantive opinion with a declaration
that the claims of the ‘623 and ‘302 Patents included laws of nature,
namely the relationship between the level of metabolites in the patient’s
blood and the effectiveness of the drug.58 The Court stated that the
correlation is a law of nature because the “relation itself exists in
principle apart from any human action,” even though resulting from the
initial action of injecting the drug.59 The Court determined that the
correlation in the wherein step in the ‘623 Patent claims was a law of
nature, because the relationship between the concentration of
metabolites and the effectiveness of the drug existed with no further
human interaction beyond the initial injection of the drug.60 Since the
correlation was a law of nature, the question before the Court became
whether or not the claims of the patent did more than just describe the
law of nature.61
To answer this question, the Court engaged in three separate
approaches to demonstrate that the claims did no more than describe the
law of nature and, as such, were not patent eligible subject matter: (1) a
step-by-step inventive concept analysis; (2) a guidepost analysis based
on prior precedents; and (3) a determination of scope and preemptive
effect of that scope.62 First, the Court analyzed each step of the method
claims to determine if the claims included more than the law of nature
itself.63 The Court stated that a claim to a process that includes a law of
nature is not patentable unless the claim has “additional features that
provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”64 The Court focused
on the need for additional elements in a claim beyond the law of nature
and referenced the Flook Court’s viewpoint that a law of nature cannot

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1297–1302.
Id. at 1297–98.
Id. at 1297.
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support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept.65
Using the principle of inventive concept, the Court analyzed the three
general process steps in the ‘623 Patent. The ‘wherein’ step, which set
forth the correlation between the blood concentrations of metabolite and
the effectiveness of the drug, was the embodiment of the law of nature at
issue. Therefore, the Court analyzed the other two steps in the method
claims to see if those steps added inventive concept independent of the
law of nature. The first step of administering the drug to a patient with
an autoimmune disease worked to confine the invention to a particular
class of patients.66 Relying on its decision in Bilski II, the Court held
that this narrowing of the use of the correlation to a specific field of
endeavor did not turn the claim into patent eligible subject matter.67 The
Court held that the second step of determining the level of metabolites
constituted pre-solution activity.68 Because methods of measuring the
level of the metabolites in the patient were well-documented in the field
of medicine, the Court classified the determination step as “well
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by
scientists who work in the field,” which was not enough to make the
claims patent eligible according to the Court’s prior decisions in Bilski II
and Flook.69 Conventional or obvious pre- or post-solution activity is
not sufficient to make a claim to a law of nature patent eligible.70 Last,
the Court looked at all three steps as a whole and determined that the
combination added nothing to the claims that did not exist in each of the
three steps taken independently.71 The Court’s first approach, based on
analyzing each step of the claim for an inventive concept separate from
the law of nature itself, resulted in a finding of invalidity.
In its second approach, the Court employed a guidepost analysis, in
which the Court compared Mayo to its two prior decisions in Diehr and
Flook, two decisions that resulted in opposing opinions.72 Diehr
involved a rubber molding process that utilized a mathematical equation
to calculate estimated residence times based on temperature
measurements inside the mold.73 Because the process claim included
the additional steps of adding rubber to the mold, closing the mold,
measuring the mold temperature, comparing the calculated value against

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1297; see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1297–98.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
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the actual elapsed time in the mold, and opening the mold when the
elapsed time equaled the calculated time, the Court found the Diehr
claims did not seek to preempt the use of the equation by others and,
therefore, were patent eligible.74 Comparing Mayo to Diehr, the Court
determined that the claims in the ‘623 Patent were weaker than the
process claims in Diehr.
In contrast, the claims in Flook included far fewer process steps and
amounted to an attempt to patent a mathematical algorithm.75 The
patent at issue in Flook involved a method for changing alarm limits in a
process control system that consisted of continuously measuring the
process variables, recalculating the alarm limits using a novel
mathematical algorithm, and storing the new alarm limit value.76 The
Flook Court determined that the process steps of measuring the process
variables and storing the new alarm limit were well-known steps in the
industry and that no inventive concept existed outside of the novel
mathematical algorithm used to perform the calculation.77 Comparing
Mayo to Flook, the Court found the ‘623 Patent claims to be no stronger
than the claims found to be un-patentable in Flook.78 Based on this
guidepost analysis, the Court found the ‘623 and ‘302 Patent claims to
be at the Flook end of the Flook–Diehr eligibility spectrum and thus not
patent eligible subject matter.79
In the third approach to patent eligible subject matter, the Court
examined the scope of the claims and decided that the claims would preempt any future use of the natural law.80 The Court began the analysis
by reviewing additional prior decisions supporting the precedent “that
simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”81
Referencing Morse, the Court recounted the discussion of the Nielsen
case, where an English court found a method for adding warm air to a
furnace to be patent eligible because the method involved nonconventional steps in addition to the natural law that adding warm air to
a furnace improves efficiency.82 Moving to Bilski II, the Court
reiterated its holding that narrowing the application of a natural law to a

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1298–99.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300–02.
Id. at 1300.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/11

12

Wisecup: Mayo v. Prometheus: Reorganizing the Toolbox for Patent Eligible

2013]

CASENOTE—MAYO V. PROMETHEUS

1663

specific field of endeavor did not make the natural law patent eligible.83
And finally, the Court referenced Gottschalk’s holding that without a
practical application of the natural law the claims would be overbroad.84
After reviewing these past precedents, the Court expressed the
concern that the continued enforcement of the claims would prevent
further use of the correlation in research.85 In Morse, the claims at issue
foreclosed the use of electro-magnetism for any future innovation in the
area of transmitting letters or characters over a distance, regardless of
the devices invented.86 Similarly in Gottschalk, the claims precluded
the use of the algorithm for converting of binary coded numbers to pure
binary numbers in any future application.87 Likewise, the Court found
that the general language employed by the ‘623 and ‘302 Patent claims
would likely preclude the use of the correlation in any future medical
research, even though the correlation is a narrow natural law applicable
only to a specific treatment with a specific drug.88 The Court found that
the claims would interfere with too much future use of the law of nature
and that this confirmed its decision to find the claims patent ineligible.89
After discussing the scope of the claims, the Court rebutted
arguments made in favor of the patentability of the claims.90 Regarding
the Federal Circuit’s application of the machine or transformation test,
the Court stated that the test is only a clue and does not trump the
judicial exception to patentability for laws of nature.91 In response to
Prometheus’s argument that the natural law itself is narrow and specific,
the Court responded that the scope of the natural law is irrelevant to the
question of patentability.92 In its amicus brief, the government argued
that any step added to a natural law should make the subject matter
patentable, because if the added step is routine in the art, then the claims
will fail the novelty and nonobvious requirements.93 The Court thought
the government’s view would do away completely with the patentable
subject matter inquiry altogether, which is inconsistent with past
precedents.94 Last, Prometheus argued that invalidating the patent
would have a chilling effect on research, because the patent incentive is
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1300–01.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1301–02.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 1302–05.
Id. at 1303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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critical to continued funding of medical research.95 The Court
responded by referencing opinions from the medical community in
opposition to this position.96
At the conclusion of the opinion, the Court addressed the scope of its
ruling. The Court stated that it hesitated to make any significant
changes to the standard for determining patentable subject matter for
fear that such a declaration may have unintended consequences in other
fields of endeavor outside of medical methods.97 The Court recognized
that Congress too has a role in clarifying any exceptions to the
patentable subject matter requirement.98 In deciding Mayo, the Court
set forth a fact-intensive, three-pronged approach for analyzing patent
eligible subject matter but added very little substantive clarity to the
uses of natural laws that are patent eligible.
B. Response to the Mayo Decision
In the months immediately following the Mayo decision, several
lower courts found cause to interpret and apply the ruling in similar
cases involving challenges to subject matter eligibility. In Association
for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO (Myriad II), the Federal
Circuit upheld its initial decision that claims to an isolated DNA
sequence and a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics were
patent eligible subject matter, but the claim to a method for analyzing
DNA sequences was not patent eligible.99 In doing so, the majority
employed pieces and parts of the Mayo decision depending on the
situation. In regards to the claims to the isolated sequences of DNA, the
majority opinion held that Mayo did not apply because a composition of
matter was not a law of nature.100 The majority then used a guideposttype analysis, based on Chakrabarty101 and Funk Brothers,102 to show
that the claims to isolated DNA sequences were indeed patentable
95. Id. at 1304.
96. Id. at 1304–05.
97. Id. at 1305.
98. Id.
99. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Following the Federal Circuit decision in Myriad I in July 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for
reconsideration in light of the decision in Mayo. Id. at 1308. The case before remand is commonly
referred to as Myriad I, and the case after remand, Myriad II.
100. Id. at 1331.
101. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding that a human engineered
bacterium capable of consuming petroleum was patent eligible subject matter).
102. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948) (holding that a
mixed culture of bacteria for inoculating seeds was not patentable subject matter because the bacteria
were unchanged from their natural state and, therefore, a phenomenon of nature).
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subject matter.103 For the two method claims, the majority used a stepby-step analysis similar to the first approach used by the Mayo Court,
except the majority focused on whether the added steps were
transformative under the machine or transformation test.104
The concurring opinion in Myriad II disagreed with the majority that
the Mayo decision applied strictly to method claims. The two
concurring judges felt that Mayo’s discussion of laws of nature “ought
to apply equally to manifestations of nature.”105 Despite the difference
of opinion on the scope of Mayo, the concurring judges agreed with the
majority that the claims directed to isolated DNA sequences were
patentable because the isolated sequences did not exist in exactly the
same chemical or physical form in nature.106 The dissenting opinion in
Myriad II argued that the claims to isolated DNA sequences were not
patentable subject matter because the claims would preempt further
efforts to isolate larger DNA sequences or whole DNA sequences.107
Not only did the judges disagree on the applicable scope of the Mayo
decision, but each of the three opinions used different parts of the Mayo
opinion to make its arguments.
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the District Court for the
Northern District of Maryland, in Classen Immunotherapies, found
patent eligible claims setting forth a method for choosing an
immunization schedule for infants.108 The claims as issue in Classen
were similar to the claims in Mayo except that the Classen claims
required the added application step of selecting the appropriate
immunization schedule.109 The court used the step-by-step method from
Mayo to show that the additional application requirement was sufficient,
without further evidence, to demonstrate that the patent claims
constituted patentable subject matter.110 The Federal Circuit case that
remanded Classen case back to the District Court is currently under
consideration for certiorari on the issue of patent eligible subject matter
under § 101.111
In SmartGene, the District Court for the District of Columbia
103. Myriad II, 689 F.3d at 1326–31.
104. Id. at 1333–37.
105. Id. at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1340–41.
107. Id. at 1349 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
108. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDG-04-2607, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112280, at *2–4 (N.D. Md. Aug. 9, 2012), on remand from, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit case is currently under consideration for
certiorari on the issue of patentable subject matter.
109. Id. at *17–19.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *4–5.
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followed the Mayo roadmap nearly verbatim in finding claims to a
method of selecting a treatment regimen using a computer program to be
non-patentable subject matter.112 Using the Mayo template as a guide,
the district court first engaged in a guidepost analysis based on Diehr,
Flook, Gottschalk, Bilski, and Mayo and then engaged in a step-by-step
analysis of each claim.113 Unlike Mayo, the district court went a step
further and added an analysis of the machine or transformation test to
make sure that it left no stone unturned.114
In response to the Mayo decision, the USPTO revised the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure to incorporate a three-prong inquiry to
determine if a process or method involving the use of a natural law is
patent eligible subject matter.115 The USPTO method first asks whether
the claims set forth a process or method consisting of a series of steps.116
The second inquiry asks whether the claim focuses on the use of a
natural law.117 Further guiding the second inquiry, the USPTO reframes
the question into whether or not the natural law is a limiting element of
the claim.118 In other words, if the natural law imposes a limitation on
the scope of the claims, then the claim may focus on the natural law. An
affirmative answer to the second inquiry prompts the examiner to
proceed to the third inquiry, which asks if the claim introduces
additional elements or steps to integrate the natural law into the
invention.119 The additional elements must be sufficient to show that
the invention is a practical application of the natural law.120
IV. DISCUSSION
The Mayo Court’s decision resulted in confusion about the scope of
the decision and in varied application in the lower courts, which
prompted an outcry from certain sectors of the medical research
community. The fuss is for the most part unwarranted, but the
confusion is not. The Court consolidated all of its prior precedents into
an extensive three-approach method for determining patent eligible
subject matter. In doing so, the Court set forth a detailed roadmap for
lower courts to follow in analyzing the specific facts of cases but
112. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs, No. 08-00642, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44138
(D.D.C. 2012).
113. Id. at *24–40.
114. Id. at *40–58.
115. MPEP § 2106.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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accomplished little to clarify the boundaries of patent eligible subject
matter for methods involving laws of nature. The discussion focuses
first on the Court’s failure to add any substantial clarification to the law
concerning patent eligibility of methods involving laws of nature. Then,
the discussion argues that evaluating the scope of the claims is superior
to consideration of inventive concept and, finally, proposes legislative
action to clarify the exception to patentable subject matter for laws of
nature, abstract ideas, and mathematical formulas.
A. Interpreting Mayo
The Court’s opinion in Mayo assembled much of the Court’s prior
precedent with respect to patent eligible subject matter for use of natural
laws into a three-approach method, effectively rearranging its toolbox
without adding any new tools. The first approach relied on inventive
concept, which first appeared with respect to subject matter eligibility of
laws of nature in the Morse case and further developed in Flook and
Bilski II.121 In the second approach, the Court compared the facts of
Mayo against the facts of two guidepost cases, Flook and Diehr. Courts
have used this method since the founding of our legal system. As part
of its analysis in Morse, the Court compared the facts before it to the
facts of a case from the English Court of Exchequer.122 In the third
approach, the Court looked at the language of the patent claims and
determined that the language was general enough to encompass all
future processes making use of the correlation and, therefore, would
negatively impact future research.123 To make that determination, the
Court compared the facts before it against prior cases, namely Morse
and Gottschalk.124 Each of the three approaches involved fact-intensive
inquiries based on prior precedents and comparison to prior cases.
Because of the Court’s reliance on precedent in its analysis, the Court
added very little to the substantive applicability of the judicial exception
for laws of nature.
In fact, the Court may have actually taken a tool out of the toolbox,
thereby perhaps reducing available precedent rather than creating
precedent. In addressing the Federal Circuit’s use of the machine or
transformation Test, the Court stated that it had not “implied that the test
trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”125 Although the Court indicated

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See supra notes 33–36, 63–72.
See supra note 28.
See supra notes 89–90.
See supra notes 86–88.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012).
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that the test may be a clue to patentability,126 it was careful not to
incorporate any part of or reference to the test in its three approach
method. This exclusion of the machine or transformation test indicated
disapproval of this method of determining the patent eligibility of uses
of natural laws.
In addition to the nature of the Court’s analysis, its own admissions
testified to the lack of substantive change made to the law. At the end of
the opinion, the Court stated, “[the Court] must hesitate before departing
from established general legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems
to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in another.”127
Declining to make any new legal rules, the Court confined its opinion to
the task of organizing and repackaging its prior precedents into a more
usable method for making the patent eligible subject matter decision.
Although the Court may have established a clear roadmap for
undertaking the patent eligible subject matter analysis, the opinion does
not add clarity to the boundary of subject matter eligibility for laws of
nature. Inventors and practitioners are still not able to distinguish
between what is and is not permissible incorporation of a law of nature.
The Court reiterated that some other inventive concept is necessary to
make the use of a natural law patentable and emphasized that
conventional pre- and post-solution activity does not make use of a
natural law patentable.128 However, the Court did not provide any
guidance on the nature of added method steps that would satisfy the
inventive concept requirement.
The inventive concept standard
continues to be a very malleable standard.
The guidepost approach also added little clarity to defining the
boundary of patentable subject matter. In summarizing its guidepost
discussion, the Court stated that the Mayo claims were “weaker than the
(patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable)
claim in Flook.”129 Presumably the opportunity for clarification exists
between the two guideposts, since one was patent eligible and the other
was not. Yet because the Court said that the Mayo claims were “no
stronger than” Flook, the case did not exist in the space between Diehr
and Flook, and therefore did nothing to further clarify the boundary
between patentable and not-patentable. All Mayo provided was another
set of facts to be an additional guidepost, but the location of that
guidepost is almost indistinguishable from the Flook guidepost, which
does nothing at all to resolve the boundary.
The Mayo opinion will likely not have a major impact on the
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 1305.
See supra notes 35–36.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.
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patenting of medical methods. Apart from the process set forth for
examining the question of patent eligible subject matter, the opinion
focused on the specific facts of Mayo. Because of the fact intensive
nature of the inquiry, the finding of invalidity was confined to the
specific case before the court, and any precedential treatment should be
limited to the process of analysis and Mayo’s position as a potential
guidepost for future litigation.
B. Consideration of the Scope of Claims is the Only Appropriate Method
for Evaluation the Natural Law Exception to Patentability
Of the three approaches that the Court set forth in Mayo, the scope of
claims method is the only appropriate method for assessing the judicial
exception to patent eligible subject matter for natural laws. First, the
step-by-step inventive concept method is not an appropriate method.
The Court’s step-by-step analysis focused on identifying an inventive
concept above and beyond the mere statement of the drug dosage
correlation itself. In doing so, the Court reiterated its prior holding that
something more than well-known, routine, and conventional steps is
required to show that the claims represent a practical application of the
law of nature and not an attempt to patent the law of nature itself.130
Some commentators have supported expansion of this inventive concept
approach to patent eligible subject matter,131 but their support is
misplaced.
Analyzing the claims in search of an inventive concept beyond the
statement of the law of nature is not the appropriate inquiry to determine
whether an invention is patent eligible subject matter under § 101. First,
incorporating inventive concept into the subject matter eligibility
determination is redundant when combined with the other requirements
for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements.132 The non-obviousness requirement in 35
U.S.C. § 103 is itself the codification of a long-held judicial
patentability exception based upon inventive concept.133 If the question
130. See supra notes 35–36.
131. Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012) (advocating for
strengthening the point of novelty (inventive concept) aspect of the Mayo decision).
132. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006).
133. JANET M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 191–95 (Aspen Publishing, 3d ed., 2009) (The idea of
“inventive concept” existed in the United States from the time of the first enactment of the patent law in
1790. The idea that some “inventive concept” was necessary to the question of patentability was a
judicial exception to the existing requirements of novelty and utility that existed before1952. In 1952,
Congress codified this judicial exception into the obviousness requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)); Graham v. John Deere, Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson in letter to Isaac
McPherson (Aug. 1813)) (Thomas Jefferson found “difficulty in ‘drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not’”).
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of inventive concept is established up front in the patent eligible subject
matter determination, then the patent system would have little reason for
the non-obviousness requirement. In responding to the government’s
amicus brief in Mayo, the Court stated that § 102 and § 103 inquiries
may overlap at times with the patentable subject matter inquiry, but that
§ 102 and § 103 inquiries should not be used to make the patentable
subject matter determination. By introducing and advocating the use of
“inventive concept,” the Court appeared to be doing just that—making
obviousness, or inventive concept, the key to a subject matter
determination by requiring that any steps added to a natural law
represents a further non-obvious inventive step.
Second, the inventive concept approach does not fulfill the law of
nature exception’s purpose, which is to promote progress by preventing
a patentee from monopolizing a law of nature and foreclosing the use of
that law of nature for future scientific research or innovation.134 The
approach asks if another inventive concept exists in the claims, but does
not consider whether the scope of the claims forecloses the use of the
law of nature in future development. Therefore, the presence of an
additional inventive concept might make a method or invention patent
eligible subject matter under the standard, but the scope of the claims
may also leave no non-infringing use of the law of nature. In cases like
Diehr, the inventive concept approach appears to work, because the
Arrhenius equation is very broad in scope with nearly unlimited
applicability, and patenting the use of the equation to calculate the
residence time for a rubber injection molding process only carves out an
insignificant sliver of the full scope of application of the natural law.
For laws of nature that have a very small scope, such as the correlation
between blood concentrations of metabolites and drug effectiveness, any
incorporation into an invention forecloses a huge chunk of the potential
future uses of the law of nature. In this second example, use of the
inventive concept approach would fail to preserve the use of the natural
law for future innovation.
Third, requiring an additional inventive concept is strikingly similar
to narrowing the use of the law of nature to a specific field of endeavor,
which the Court has held is not sufficient to make a law of nature patent
eligible subject matter.135 Finally, the inventive concept approach does
not provide a clear, unambiguous standard for the lower courts to apply.
“Inventive concept” itself is an ambiguous term susceptible to various
interpretations of just how much inventive concept is necessary to make
the claims patent eligible subject matter. The Bilski II Court held that

134. See supra notes 29–31.
135. See supra note 36.
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well-known, routine, and conventional steps are insufficient to provide
the necessary inventive concept.136 The other data point is Diehr, which
involved a detailed rubber molding process, of which the law of nature
was only a small part.137 The space in between is subject to near infinite
interpretation.
Moving on to the Court’s second approach, the guidepost analysis is
insufficient to address patent eligible subject matter at this time. The
guidepost approach compared the facts of the case to data points
generated from prior litigation. This method can be effective if the
guideposts clearly define the boundary between allowed and disallowed
conduct, but in the case of the judicial exception to patent eligible
subject matter, the space between any two guideposts is too large to
provide notice of the uses of a natural law that are patentable. In Mayo,
the guideposts consisted of Flook and Diehr, which were too far apart to
give any greater insight into the boundary between patentable and
unpatentable. Like the inventive concept approach, the guidepost
approach also does not directly assess the preclusive effect of the claims
and, therefore, does not address the underlying purpose of the judicial
exception.
The most appropriate approach to decide the patent eligibility of
practical uses of natural laws is to analyze the scope of the patent claims
at issue and determine whether the claims substantially foreclose the use
of the law of nature in other applications. The Court in Gottschalk stated
that natural laws are the building blocks of scientific research,138 and the
Mayo Court suggested that patent protection of these laws of nature may
actually impede innovation.139 Bearing in mind this initial purpose of
the judicial exception, the proper standard for evaluating the patent
eligible subject matter requirement should focus on the scope of the
claims and the preclusive effect of that scope. Any other inquiry would
fail to satisfy the underlying purpose of the exception.
Like inventive concept, claim scope analysis also introduces
ambiguity into the question of patent eligible subject matter for uses of
laws of nature, but unlike inventive concept, which attempts to impose a
clear rule based on the text of the claims, claim scope analysis is
necessarily a case-by-case balancing of interests. The key element of
claim scope analysis is interpreting the scope of the claims, and lower
courts should have sufficient experience in construing claims, because
of the courts’ duty to decide issues of claim construction in patent

136.
137.
138.
139.

Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–84 (1981).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
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infringement cases.140 Courts can add objectivity and definiteness to the
claim scope analysis by developing key factors such as the narrowness
of the natural law, the existence and scope of non-infringing
applications of the natural law, and the intent of the infringing party.141
The Court is well-accustomed to performing such multi-factor balancing
inquiries in the patent law field,142 which makes a scope of claims
analysis easier to implement in the lower courts compared to inventive
concept. The Court might also ease the difficulty of claim scope
analysis by shifting the burden to the patentee, upon a sufficient
showing of ineligible subject matter by the defendant, to demonstrate
substantial non-infringing uses of the natural law.
Because a scope of claims analysis promotes the underlying purpose
of the judicial exception for natural laws and the lower courts are
accustomed to performing multi-factor balancing approaches in patent
law, a scope of claims analysis is the most appropriate approach to
deciding the question of patent eligible subject matter for inventions
incorporating a law of nature.
C. Patent Eligibility for Natural Laws is Ripe for Legislative Action
Evaluating the scope of patent claims and determining whether or not
the claims foreclose the use of a natural law in further innovation is
often a judgment call that could have broad implications outside of the
subject matter at issue. One important consideration is whether or not
allowing such claims would have an effect on the pace of innovation in
the field of endeavor and how significant that effect would be. This
leads to public policy questions on the importance of research and
development activities in several areas, such as computer science,
genetics, and medical methods.
Although the Court is often called upon to make such policy
judgments, Congress is better suited to consider such public policy
issues. First, members of Congress are elected by popular vote and,
therefore, are accountable to their constituents and political supporters,
and because of this accountability, members of Congress are more in
tune with the needs and desires of the public and better suited to
140. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 384–91 (1996).
141. In Mayo, the circumstances and facts giving rise to the case might suggest that Mayo
intended to get around the patent rather than attempting to improve upon the correlation.
142. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (setting forth four factors for
determining nonobvious under 35 USC § 103); see also In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–51
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (establishing factors for determining whether a prior art reference is publicly
accessible); see also, e.g., City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1878)
(listing factors for determining if a public use qualifies for the experimental use exception to the 102(b)
loss of patent right). Federal courts have used multi-factor analysis for a very long time.
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addressing questions of public policy. In contrast, federal judges are
appointed for life, which means they are not reliant on a constituency for
re-election and not accountable to the public beyond a sense of duty.
Beyond being accountable to the public, Congress has more resources
with which to determine and evaluate public policy. Congress possesses
the exclusive power of appropriation, which is necessary to commission
extensive investigation into public policy matters, and employs an
extensive political process to expose potential legislative solutions to
public comment and criticism. Also, the process of legislation itself
exposes a proposed solution to scrutiny and debate from various
interests and public policies. The Court, on the other hand, is limited to
information contained in the record of the case and submitted by the
parties and amici. Though the justices may debate amongst themselves
in chambers, this is a far cry from the public debate on the floor of the
House of Representatives. The Court in Mayo even recognized the role
that Congress has in clarifying the law.143
Congress also has experience in making changes to the patent system
to codify judicial exceptions or adapt to changing public policies.
Congress adopted the judicial exception to patentability for inventions
lacking inventive concept by enacting the non-obvious standard in 35
U.S.C. § 103 and implemented separate patent regimes for plant patents
and design patents in response to changing public policies. Congress
has proven quite capable at addressing these changes in public policy by
enacting appropriate legislation. With the importance of health care
innovation to the nation’s economy and the potential impact upon the
patent system, the time has come for Congress to take a closer look at
this issue.
Concerning patent eligibility for laws of nature, Congress should start
with a study addressing the potential impact on innovation. Only with
concrete data can our lawmakers make sound public policy decisions.
Otherwise, Congress would be doing exactly what the Court is doing—
theorizing on potential arguments for and against patentability without
any real information on the actual effects on research and development.
Although comparative data may not be readily obtainable for the impact
of the judicial exception on the rate of innovation in the medical method
field, Congress’s other actions to implement specific programs for plant
and design patents may offer some insight. In addition, Congress should
look to the impact of the 1952 codification of the non-obviousness
requirement had on innovation. Last, Congress can look at the impact of
some recent judicial decisions in the patent field, for instance the KSR
decision, which broadened the reach of the obviousness requirement,
143. See supra note 99.
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making it more difficult to obtain a patent.144 Examining patent
submissions and research and development expenditures following each
of these events may be a starting point to find out the actual impact of
changes to the patent law.
Should a study find a substantial impact on the rate of innovation,
Congress should avoid making a far-reaching and unpredictable change
to the law by confining regulation to the field of medical methods,
specifically. Each field of endeavor poses unique challenges and,
therefore, may not be adequately addressed by the same legislative
actions. For instance, the software and computer fields present patent
eligible subject matter issues, but also involve a rate of innovation far
faster than the rate of innovation of medical methods. The nature of
innovation is also vastly different based on the modular method of
programming generally accepted by the software development industry.
The Mayo Court expressed concern that a sweeping change in one area
could have unforeseen consequences in other fields.145 Because of this,
Congress may find prudence in addressing each field independently.
As part of any regulatory system, Congress should begin by clearly
defining terms, such as “law of nature,” “abstract idea,” and
“mathematical algorithm.” Second, Congress should enact legislation
that requires an application step for medical method claims making use
of a natural law or correlation. This would provide the USPTO with
some basis to differentiate between patents that attempt to preclude the
use of a natural law and those that do not. A goal of any regulatory
patent system should be to promote the strength of the patents issued by
the government.
Third, Congress should address the preemptive scope of patent claims
that involve natural laws by making claims foreclosing the use of natural
laws unenforceable against future uses of the nature law in research and
development or innovation activities. Such a rule would allow patents
involving natural laws to issue without overly intensive scrutiny,
provided they first had an application step. Because every invention
must rely on some manifestation of a law of nature, patent claims may
be difficult to draft without referencing or describing a natural law on
which the claim is based. Since preemptive scope is the foundation
upon which the judicial exception was built, it makes sense to include
this requirement in a regulatory scheme to codify the exception. The
result would be to confine the infringement question to the differences
between the patent and the infringing use with respect to the steps
beyond description of the natural law. The effect would be to carve out

144. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
145. See supra note 98.
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the natural law and compare what is left with the conventional tools of
novelty and obviousness under § 102 and § 103. This approach would
prevent preemption of the natural law for future innovation, and at the
same time, discourage potential infringers from attempting to
circumvent a patent by making a trivial change to the method, like Mayo
Collaborative Services did by merely changing the toxicity limit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The medical methods industry waited, hopefully, for the opinion in
Mayo to clarify the scope of patent eligible subject matter for medical
methods based on natural laws. Sadly, the Court merely reorganized its
toolbox of prior precedent into an elaborate and fact intensive process
for evaluating the patent eligible subject matter requirement for uses of
natural laws, but did little to actually clarify the boundary between what
is patentable and what is unpatentable. The decision will likely have
little effect on the future interpretation of the judicial exception for
natural laws.
Because of the important public policy issues that arise with the
patentability of natural laws, Congress is better suited to the task of
clarifying the law with respect to the use of natural laws in patent
claims. Although complete abrogation of any doubt over the boundaries
of patentability is an impossible task, Congress, with a few small
changes to the existing patent law system, can make a great
improvement in the predictability of the patent law with respect to the
use of natural laws. After all, this is really what we all want: a standard
to help us decide what discoveries we can and cannot protect.
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